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THE USE AND ABUSE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
STEPHEN A. NEWMAN*
On Monday May 17, 2004, Hillary Smith Goodridge, 48, and
Julie Wendrich Goodridge, 46, were married in Boston. They
needed more than their mutual commitment to get to the altar.
They fought for their right to wed as the lead plaintiffs in the
landmark case that permitted gay marriage in Massachusetts. At
the wedding, a mutual friend who first introduced them to one an-
other remarked: "You introduce a couple of people, you maybe
encourage them a bit, and what happens? A national crisis. The
fault line for the presidential elections. The coming of
Armageddon."'
The Goodridge2 case unleashed, if not Armageddon, a cultural
storm with political and legal ramifications that are impossible to
calculate. Comparisons to Brown v. Board of Education3 have been
made, encouraged by the fact that the first marriage licenses au-
thorized by the Goodridge decision were issued on May 17, the fifti-
eth anniversary, to the day, of Brown. Commentator Andrew
Sullivan wrote in an op-ed piece in the New York Times on that day
that "both Brown and this new day revolve around a single, simple
and yet deeply elusive idea: integration. '4 Gay marriage, he ex-
plained, meant the integration of families with their own gay mem-
bers and the partners they love; the integration of gay people into
the civil status of marriage; and the integration of homosexual citi-
zens into the mainstream institutions of American life.
The same-sex marriage issue became a part of presidential
election year politics when President George W. Bush delivered a
speech on February 24, 2004, declaring his support for an amend-
ment to the constitution that would define marriage exclusively as a
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. J.D. Columbia University, 1970; B.A.
University of Pennsylvania, 1967.
1. Weddings/Celebrations, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2004, at 15.
2. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
3. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. Integration Day, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A21.
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union between a man and a woman. He asserted: "Ages of experi-
ence have taught humanity that the commitment of husband and
wife to love and to serve one another promotes the welfare of chil-
dren and the stability of society."5
In court cases and in the national political debate over same-
sex marriage, both proponents and opponents regularly appeal to
social science to support their positions that the welfare of children
is well-served or ill-served by same-sex marriage. Although each
side would love to have a conclusive, scientific "silver bullet" that
eliminates all doubt, no definitive answers reside in social science
research. Not only judges, but voters considering ballot initiatives,
legislators evaluating proposed bills, and ordinary citizens attempt-
ing to assess the material they read in their daily newspapers must
know how to weigh the social science claims made by advocates on
both sides.
This article will focus on the problematic use of social science
to make claims about the welfare of children in the same-sex mar-
riage debate. After showing the reasons why no definitive answers
are afforded by the social science so far available, I will suggest how
some conclusions can nevertheless be drawn about the well being
of children if same-sex couples are permitted to marry.
Some useful perspective can be gained by first looking back at
two other controversies in our history in which advocates enlisted
science in the service of legal and political positions. The first is the
controversy over interracial marriage; the second is the debate over
eugenics and involuntary sterilization.
I. SCIENCE IN THE INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE DEBATE
A cautionary lesson may be drawn from the experience with
the use of science in the struggle over state anti-miscegenation stat-
utes. The first court to overturn a statutory ban on interracial mar-
5. Bush's Remarks on Marriage Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A18 (full
transcript). The version of the Amendment under active consideration in Congress at
the time, introduced by Rep. Marilyn Musgrave, stated:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state
or federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal
incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
[Vol. 49
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
riage was the Supreme Court of California, in Perez v. Lippold.6 It
did so over a vigorous dissent by three judges. The dissent, au-
thored by Justice Shenk, cited numerous scientific reports to show
that the legislative judgment banning interracial marriage was
based upon respectable scientific opinion. The cited articles ap-
peared in well regarded professional journals, including the Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association, Science, the American
Journal of Physical Anthropology, and the Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana. Justice Shenk quoted experts to support the proposition that
"crossing of the primary races leads gradually to retrogression and
eventual extinction of the resultant type unless it is fortified by re-
union with the parent stock."' 7 Professor J.W. Gregory at the Uni-
versity of Glasgow was quoted as finding that "the intermixtures
which have been beneficial to the progress of mankind have been
between nearly related peoples and that the results of a mixture of
widely divergent stock serve to warn against the miscegenation of
distinct races." Justice Shenk further credits Professor Gregory
with the notion that "where two such [widely distinct] races are in
contact the inferior qualities are not bred out, but may be empha-
sized in the progeny, a principle widely expressed in modern eu-
genic literature."9
Following the same line of argument, Justice Shenk described
an extensive study done in Jamaica by a team of scientists who
studied:
[i]n detail and comparatively, 100 each of adults of full-
blooded Negroes (Blacks), Europeans (Whites), and
White-Black mixtures of all degrees (Browns). Half of the
hundred were of each sex. In addition to the main pro-
ject some 1200 children of school and pre-school age
were observed and measured. Finally in 1929, an exten-
sive report was published by the Carnegie Institution, in
book form entitled "Race Crossing in Jamaica," by B.C.
Davenport and Morris Steggerda, in collaboration with
others. The results of their investigation indicated that
6. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
7. Id. at 44.
8. Id., citingJ.W. GREGORY, THE MENACE OF COLOR 227 (1925).
9. Id.
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the crossing of distinct races is biologically undesirable
and should be discouraged.' 0
Justice Shenk offered sociological insights to bolster the biolog-
ical contentions. A Harvard academic, W.E. Castle, contributed this
insight:
If all inheritance of human traits were simple Mendelian
inheritance, and natural selections were unlimited in its
action among human populations, then unrestricted ra-
cial crossing might be recommended. But in the light of
our present knowledge, few would recommend it. For, in
the first place, much that is best in human existence is a
matter of social inheritance, not of biological inheritance.
Race crossings disturb social inheritance. That is one of
its worst features."
From these studies Justice Shenk concluded:
The foregoing excerpts from scientific articles and legal
authorities make it clear that there is not only some but a
great deal of evidence to support the legislative determi-
nation... that intermarriage between Negroes and white
persons is incompatible with the general welfare and
therefore a proper subject for regulation under the police
power. There may be some who maintain that there does
not exist adequate data ... to enable a decision to be
made as to the effects of the original admixture of white
and Negro blood. However, legislators are not required
to wait upon the completion of scientific research to de-
termine whether the underlying facts carry sufficient
weight to more fully sustain the regulation.' 2
The majority, under the leadership of Justice Roger Traynor,
noted that discriminatory notions of racial superiority were long
part of California legal history. He cited the 1854 decision of the
California Supreme Court that justified a ban on Chinese persons
testifying against white people in court. The decision referred to
the Chinese "as a race of people whom nature has marked as infer-
10. Perez, 198 P.2d at 45.
11. Id., quoting W.E. Castle, Biological and Social Consequences of Race Crossing, 9 AM.
J. OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 152 (1926).
12. Id.
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ior, and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development
beyond a certain point"; further, their "mendacity is proverbial."
13
Traynor rejected assertions of racial inferiority, including those
based upon a supposed concern for future generations of children
born of interracial marriages. He likened the arguments to those
made in the oft-cited case of Scott v. State, which stated:
The amalgamation of the races is not only unnatural, but
is always productive of deplorable results. Our daily ob-
servation shows us, that the offspring of these unnatural
connections are generally sickly and effeminate, and that
they are inferior in physical development and strength, to
the full-blood of either race. 14
Traynor found modern experts rejected such an observation. A
concurring justice, commenting on the "medico-eugenic" evidence
in the case, wrote: "A great deal has been written and said about
the desirability or undesirability of racial mixtures. The writers
seem to be in such hopeless conflict that their lack of bias may well
be questioned. '15
The U.S. Supreme Court took another nineteen years to deal
the death blow to anti-miscegenation statutes outside California. In
that case, Loving v. Virginia,1 6 the State Attorney General was still
clinging to arguments of experts that the intermixing of the races
would be detrimental to legitimate state interests, including the wel-
fare of children. 17 The Virginia Attorney General, Robert Y. But-
ton, cited the 1959 case of State v. Brown, 18 which expressed its
solicitude for the offspring of such marriages in these words:
A state statute which prohibits intermarriage or cohabita-
tion between members of different races.., falls squarely
within the police power of the state, which has an interest
in maintaining the purity of the races and in preventing
the propagation of half-breed children. Such children
have difficulty in being accepted by society, and there is
13. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854).
14. 39 Ga. 321, 323 (1869).
15. Perez, 198 P.2d at 33.
16. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
17. Brief for Appellee at 35, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395).
18. 108 So.2d 233 (La. 1959).
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no doubt that children in such a situation are burdened,
as has been said in another connection, with "a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 19
The court's quotation about the children's likely feeling of in-
feriority is taken, incredibly enough, from the law's most important
case promoting integration of the races, Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.20 The segregationists deployment of arguments about the wel-
fare of children was merely a tactical move in the ideological
campaign to maintain a discriminatory legal and social system.
II. SCIENCE IN THE EUGENICS ERA
The eugenics movement in scientific circles had a profound
impact on the law in the first half of the twentieth century. Belief in
the ability to improve the gene pool supported the passage of invol-
untary sterilization statutes in a number of states. Mentally im-
paired persons were the primary target of these statutes. The result
was the disastrous deprivation of reproductive rights to tens of
thousands of loosely defined "feeble minded" people. Some states
sterilized persons who committed one of an ever growing list of of-
fenses and conditions, which included certain specified crimes,
such as alcoholism, drug addiction, and even blindness and deaf-
ness, on the theory that these conditions were inherited. The steril-
ization laws would prevent those conditions from being passed on
to the next generation. Over thirty states had these laws, with Cali-
fornia and Virginia leading the way in the actual performance of
coerced sterilization operations. 2'
Even Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was taken in by the
questionable science of eugenics, as evidenced by the unfortunate
opinion he authored in Buck v. Bell,22 which upheld the constitu-
tionality of Virginia's involuntary sterilization law. Holmes's
description of the children of the mentally impaired is so callous as
19. Id. at 234.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. For a compelling overview of the eugenics movement and the case of Buck v.
Bell 274 U.S. 200 (1927), see Stephen J. Gould, Carrie Buck's Daughter, 2 CONST. COM.
331 (1985).
22. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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to be shocking to the modern reader. "It is better for all the world,"
he wrote, "if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for
crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind ....
Three generations of imbeciles are enough."23 Justice Souter's re-
cent concurrence in Tennessee v. Lane,24 includes Buck in a series of
court decisions upholding laws discriminating against persons with
mental disabilities. These laws sometimes prevented disabled chil-
dren from attending public school.25
The Buck decision, based on flawed science and on accepted
social prejudice, is bad enough. What made the particular case of
Carrie Buck so utterly tragic was the fact, discovered many years
later by scholars like Professor Paul Lombardo of the University of
Virginia Law School, that Carrie Buck was not mentally handi-
capped at all, but rather was a poor woman of normal intelligence,
sent to the "State Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded" to have
her illegitimate baby.26 School records indicated that her daugh-
ter, Vivian Buck, the third generation cited by Holmes, was also of
perfectly sound mind. Another family member, Carrie's sister Do-
ris, had also been sterilized, but had been told that her operation
was for appendicitis. 27
Eugenic sterilization found continued favor in Nazi Germany,
but its popularity in the United States eventually faded. In the 1942
case of Skinner v. Oklahoma,28 the Supreme Court remarked:
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-
reaching, and devastating effects. In evil or reckless
hands it can cause races or types which are inimical to the
dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no re-
demption for the individual whom the law touches....
He is forever deprived of a basic liberty.29
23. Id. at 207.
24. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
25. Id. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring).
26. See Gould, supra note 21.
27. Id. at 335.
28. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
29. Id. at 541.
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III. SCIENTIFIc EXPERTISE IN THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
The experience with eugenic sterilization and with interracial
marriage bans illustrates the dangerous pressure that prejudice and
science, working together, can exert on the law.
In our times, opponents of same-sex marriage have called
upon scientific experts to testify that same-sex marriage will harm
children. Whenever social science reinforces popular prejudice,
the social science must be subject to the most searching scrutiny.
Because the position that same-sex marriage would damage the well
being of children is aligned with the long tradition of anti-gay bias
in this country, it deserves careful examination. I will also scruti-
nize the shortcomings of expert testimony offered in support of
same-sex marriage, to fully explore the role of social science in this
controversy.30
For illustration, I will choose some examples from two promi-
nent same-sex marriage cases, Baehr v. Miike l and Goodridge v. De-
partment of Public Health.32
In Baehr, Judge Chang of the Circuit Court of Hawaii described
the expert testimony offered by the State and by the plaintiffs. The
first state witness, Dr. Kyle Pruett, a psychiatrist, was an expert in
child development. He discussed his study of intact families in
which children were raised primarily by their fathers. He con-
cluded that the children were "competent and robust in their devel-
opment, and are not sources of clinical concern."33 The doctor
added some generalizations about the special contributions that fa-
thers can make in childrearing and the benefits that biological par-
ents bring to parenting. The study Pruett described consisted of
only fifteen families. While the doctor's finding is unsurprising, the
sample is too small to draw any reliable generalization about all
families with fathers who take primary care of children. Further,
when the sample is so small, one wonders how he selected the fami-
30. The need to explore the validity of social science, even when used to combat
social prejudice, is highlighted by the debate over the use of social science in Brown.
For a discussion on the Brown controversy, see Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in
Historical Context: Social Science and The Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 793 (2002).
31. 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
32. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
33. Baehr, 1996 "AIL 694235, at *4.
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lies for study. Often selection is from a group that is atypical of the
whole population, with important characteristics not widely shared
by the group. Finally, the study tells nothing about gay and lesbian
families, except by implication (i.e., that lesbian families, lacking
fathers, are deficient). Nevertheless, Dr. Pruett conceded that "in
general, gay and lesbian parents are as fit and loving as non-gay
persons and couples," that "single parents, gay fathers, lesbian
mothers, adoptive parents, foster parents and same-sex couples can
be, and do become, good parents," and that "gay and lesbian par-
ents are 'doing a good job' and that 'the kids are turning out just
fine.' "34
Another state witness, Dr. David Eggebeen, offered expertise in
sociology and demographics. He equated children in same-sex
families with children in step-families, and described the greater
risks such children are at for economic poverty, conduct disorders,
poor school performance, and teenage pregnancy. But Dr. Eg-
gebeen, no doubt on cross examination, had to concede that some
same-sex family situations are not at all comparable to step-families.
Step-families usually are created after the birth of one of the new
spouse's children, and adjustment issues can be expected to arise.
Adjustment problems are avoided when the two same-sex partners
are together prior to the birth of the child. Further, step-family
formation often follows a painful divorce that may have traumatized
the children, causing difficulty for any new family arrangement.
The step-family analogy fails to take account of such significant dif-
ferences in family environments.
Dr. Eggebeen also tried to characterize cohabiting same-sex
couples as less stable than married couples. Judge Chang noted
that the only basis for this conclusion was a chart in a book. The
information in the chart was twenty years old.35 Even with more
reliable data, it is plausible to think that same-sex cohabitation
might differ in stability from same-sex marriage, making data about
cohabitation of little relevance to predictions about the stability of
same-sex marriages.
Next, the state presented Dr. Richard Williams, a psychologist
with a specialty in research methods and statistics. He offered criti-
34. Id. at *5.
35. Id. at *8.
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cism of studies of gay and lesbian parenting that the state antici-
pated the plaintiffs would rely upon. Dr. Williams lost all credibility
in the court's eyes because he expressed broad distrust of the entire
field of psychology and disdained social science in general; as for
the theory of evolution, he claimed there was no scientific proof it
had ever occurred. Ironically, Dr. Williams accurately identified
three major problems with studies of gay and lesbian families, sum-
marized in the judge's opinion as: "(1) there was non-representa-
tive sampling of heterosexual, gay and lesbian parents; (2)
inadequate sample size was employed; and (3) comparison groups
used in the studies were not comparable in terms of household
makeup." 36 The court found the witness's opinions about science
in general so outlandish that it missed the value of the specific testi-
mony he offered.
Finally, the state called Dr. Thomas Merrill, an expert in the
psychology of human development. He said it is important for chil-
dren to learn from opposite sex parents; each parent offers a model
for learning. At some times in a child's development, he theorized,
his relationships with the parent of his own sex is most important,
and at other times the relationship with the opposite sex parent is
most important. He said insufficient information existed about the
effects of gay or lesbian parenting on child development. Unfortu-
nately, Dr. Merrill seems to have made no effort to study gay and
lesbian parenting. The court noted that:
His clinical experience with families involving one or two
gay or lesbian parents is limited. Dr. Merrill has not testi-
fied as an expert in Family Court cases which involved the
sexual orientation of a parent or a same-sex couple and
the custody of a child. He has not participated in or con-
ducted any study which focused on the children of gay
and lesbian parents.3 7
Interestingly, when asked on direct examination "in what fam-
ily structure are children most likely to reach their optimal develop-
ment?" Merrill replied:
36. Id.
37. Id. at *9.
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Children are most apt to reach their optimal level of de-
velopment as exhibited in terms of their adjustment as
adults in a family in which there is a limited amount of
strife, a maximum amount of nurturing, a maximum
amount of support, a maximum amount of guidance, a
maximum amount of leadership, and a very strong and
intimate bond between parents and child.
3 8
This apt description could of course include same-sex parents. No
doubt realizing this, the state's lawyer followed up with a question
that reminded the expert which side he was on: "And does the pres-
ence of the mother and father improve the likelihood that there
will be a strong bond?"3 9 Merrill dutifully replied: "That would be
a significant part of the maximum optimum environment in which
to raise a child, yes." 40
Plaintiffs' experts in Baehr included Dr. Charlotte Patterson,
who offered expertise in child development, particularly with re-
spect to gay and lesbian parenting. She described her "Bay Area
Family Study," a research project that showed a set of children of
lesbian mothers were developing "in a normal fashion." She stud-
ied thirty-seven families in one geographic area. Whatever her con-
clusions - which included the positive finding of normal
development and a negative finding that these children expressed
feelings of greater stress in their lives - no finding can be genera-
lized from her minuscule sample to the larger population of chil-
dren of lesbian mothers. The judge reported that Dr. Patterson
"agreed that the sample ... when considering ethnic background,
education, income and other socioeconomic factors, is not repre-
sentative of women and all mothers in America." 4 1 Moreover, the
sample encompassed younger children only, ranging in age from
four to nine. This meant that any problems that might manifest
themselves in the teenage years would be invisible. Dr. Patterson,
to her credit, concluded that "the particular group of children"
were developing normally, and did not try to generalize from the
38. Baher, 1996 WL 694235, at *10.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *13.
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study (although she did testify that the research literature sup-
ported gay and lesbian parenting).
Studies sometimes artfully conclude. For example, Charlotte
Patterson's conclusion, cited in In re Adoption of Caitlin, is expressed
in these terms: "In summary, concerns about difficulties in personal
development among children of gay and lesbian parents are not
sustained by results of existing research." 42 And: "There is no evi-
dence to suggest that psychological development among children
of gay men or lesbians is compromised in any respect relative to
that among offspring of heterosexual parents."43 The emphasis is
on the lack of evidence, not on the presence of proof.
In litigation, lawyers may use studies that are little more than
anecdotal in nature to make momentous claims. Josephine Ross's
account 44 of the Goodridge case in Massachusetts describes how the
state Attorney General argued, in the lower courts, that gays did not
legally deserve marriage licenses, in part because of the state's inter-
est in the children of gay parents. In one section of the state's brief,
Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas F. Reilly wrote:
In particular, adolescent girls raised by lesbian parents
tend to be more sexually active and adventurous than
girls raised by opposite-sex parents. Given the strong
state interest in limiting teenage pregnancies, this finding
alone could rationally lead the Legislature to limit mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples.45
Ross tracked down the one, single study the Attorney General re-
lied on to support this statement. It turned out to be a study done
of girls who grew to become teenagers in the 1990s in England. A
mere handful of girls were in the study. The researchers compared
sixteen daughters of lesbians with nine daughters of heterosexual
mothers. The tiny sample could hardly allow reliable conclusions
to be drawn about English girls brought up by lesbians or straights,
42. In re Adoption of Caitlin, 622 N.Y.S.2d 835, 840-41 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994).
43. Id. at 841.
44. Josephine Ross, Riddle for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscege-
nation Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 999, 1005-06 (2002). This article
was written before the Goodridge case was decided by Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.
45. Id. at 1003.
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much less about tens of thousands of girls in America living with
lesbian parents under widely varying conditions and circumstances.
The Attorney General's misuse of the study was compounded
when his brief drew a conclusion about teenage pregnancy. None
of the daughters of lesbians in the study had unwanted
pregnancies. The Attorney General also conveniently failed to
mention the boys who were in the study; as Ross notes, "when sons
were included in the statistics, there was no difference between sex-
ual adventurousness of children from straight and gay mothers at
all."'4 6 The Attorney General also left out the study's main conclu-
sion, that children raised by lesbian mothers progressed well in
their personal and social development in both childhood and
adolescence.
Lawyers are trained not to present the whole truth, but one
side's version of the truth. In their hands, social science becomes a
useful tool, but not always a truthful tool.47 Even when scientific
studies themselves note the limitations to which they are subject,
and caution against drawing unwarranted conclusions, lawyers can
ignore such caveats, as the Attorney General apparently did in this
case.
48
IV. DECISIONMAING GUIDELINES
In the absence of conclusive social science that all can agree
upon, society still needs to make decisions. The voters in various
states face ballot measures that challenge gay marriage, the Con-
46. Id. at 1005.
47. For an article canvassing the many pitfalls of expert testimony, see Stephen A.
Newman, Assessing the Quality of Expert Testimony in Cases Involving Children, 22 J. PSYCHIA-
TRY & LAw 181 (1994). The Supreme Court's decisions in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 137
(1999), have added a new issue, that of the admissibility of such testimony. While this
complex question is beyond the scope of this article, several articles have usefully ex-
plored the application of the judge's "gatekeeping" function to social science evidence.
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of "Appropriate Validation" in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition,
Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 735 (2003); Michael Risinger,
Defining the "Task at Hand": Non-Science Forensic Science After Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmi-
chael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 767 (2000).
48. See Ross, supra note 44, at 1005. Reilly met with gay bar members and ex-
pressed regret about the brief's overreaching and promised the charge of promiscuity
would not appear in the next appellate brief.
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gress has begun hearings on the federal marriage amendment, state
legislators are considering state constitutional amendments to ban
gay marriage, state governors and attorneys general are issuing posi-
tion statements and legal opinions, and courts across the nation are
dealing with equal rights claims under their own state constitutions.
This active consideration by all three branches of government
can not await a "definitive" answer from social science experts.
With respect to an issue as complex as children's development, we
may never get such an answer. The studies needed would have to
be extensive in scope and sound in conception, with rigorous meth-
odology and well reasoned analysis. Extensive studies are expen-
sive, and social science rarely receives the kind of financial support
that the "hard" sciences do. Even if funding were available, difficul-
ties persist. It is not clear, for example, how to define "normal"
development in children, or how to measure such variables as "self-
esteem." Moreover, levels of self esteem, attachment to parents,
stress, and other aspects of children's lives differ not only from
child to child, but for each child over time. Longitudinal studies of
a large group of children might help, but by definition these studies
take years, they are expensive, and researchers tend to lose contact
with the children and families over a long period of time.
Finally, the question being studied, how well children do with
same-sex parenting, might be affected by the parents' marrying. As
of yet, we have only a few marriages of same-sex couples, in Massa-
chusetts, and their status is under question because of the legisla-
ture's first step toward banning such marriages by means of
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. No study can tell us
how this marriage variable will affect children, unless we allow some
same-sex marriages and leave them alone for some time.
Although definitive studies are not in the offing, we can make
informed decisions based on sound decision making principles and
the admittedly limited information now available. I suggest four
helpful principles, derived from judicial decisions in courts across
the nation.
[Vol. 49
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A. Avoid Stereotypes that Cast Doubt upon Whole Categories of
People Acting in the Role of Parent
It is not surprising that in determining the best interests of
children, courts have felt it necessary to reject generalizations about
parenting that tend to denigrate large categories of people. In one
notable case, the Supreme Court of California reversed a custody
determination in favor of a mother because it was based upon the
trial court's ideas about the inability of persons with physical disa-
bilities to carry out the responsibilities of parenting.49 The father
in the case had been raising the children after his wife left the fam-
ily and failed to ever visit the children until the lawsuit, almost five
years later. When the father suffered physical paralysis after an au-
tomobile accident, the mother sought a change in custody. The
trial court doubted that any physically disabled man could be an
adequate father. The California Supreme Court reacted emphati-
cally to this wholesale rejection of a class of parents, stating: "It is
... common knowledge that many persons with physical handicaps
have demonstrated their ability to adequately support and control
their children and to give them the benefits of stability and security
through love and attention. '' 50 The court observed that:
a handicapped parent is a whole person to the child who
needs his affection, sympathy, and wisdom to deal with
the problems of growing up. Indeed, in such matters his
handicap may well be an asset: few can pass through the
crucible of a severe physical disability without learning en-
during lessons in patience and tolerance. 51
In cases involving the placement of children, courts and legisla-
tures are properly wary of broad generalizations. As the New York
Court of Appeals memorably wrote in Freiderwitzer v. Freiderwitzer
"The only absolute in the law governing the custody of children is
that there are no absolutes." 52 Sweeping statements about any
group, be it handicapped persons, interracial couples, or homosex-
uals, often reflect little more than prevailing social prejudice and
intolerance.
49. Carney v. Carney, 598 P.2d 36 (1979).
50. Id. at 44, quoting In re Eugene W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 623, 629-30 (1972).
51. Id. at 44.
52. 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93 (1982).
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B. Determine Children's Best Interests by Considering the Many
Factors, Tangible and Intangible, that Affect Their Well-
being
Courts have long experience dealing with determinations of
the best interests of children. Cases involving disputes over the
parenting of children are characterized by individualized, in-depth
investigations that look carefully at a variety of facts and circum-
stances. Rather than group caretakers into broad categories, courts
try to determine the quality of individual caretakers.
Several key cases have examined the parenting ability of same-
sex couples. In In re Adoption of Caitlin,5 3 a New York family court
approved adoptions by the partners of women in same-sex relation-
ships. Each couple was composed of two intelligent, stable, mature
women, who the court felt were, and would continue to be, excel-
lent parents:
The family environments presented in these adoption
cases are warm, loving and supportive, well-suited for the
nurturance of children. The Court is less concerned for
the welfare of these adoptive children than for many of
the children of heterosexual parents who find themselves
before the Court. In short, these adoptions were granted
because it was in the children's best interests to do so.54
Another adoption case involved two women in a long term re-
lationship who were both members of the Harvard medical school
faculty.5 5 The women planned the birth of a child to one of them
via artificial insemination by a known donor. They raised the child
together. When they filed a joint petition for adoption, the court
described their parenting qualifications and the extensive judicial
hearing that took place, in these terms:
Over a dozen witnesses, including mental health profes-
sionals, teachers, colleagues, neighbors, blood relatives
and a priest and nun, testified to the fact that Helen and
Susan participate equally in raising Tammy, that Tammy
relates to both women as her parents, and that the three
53. 622 N.Y.S.2d 835.
54. Id.
55. In re Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993).
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form a healthy, happy, and stable family unit. Educators
familiar with Tammy testified that she is an extremely
well-adjusted, bright, creative, cheerful child who inter-
acts well with other children and adults. A priest and nun
from the parties' church testified that Helen and Susan
are active parishioners, that they routinely take Tammy to
church and church-related activities, and that they attend
to the spiritual and moral development of Tammy in an
exemplary fashion. Teachers from Tammy's school testi-
fied that Helen and Susan both actively participate as vol-
unteers in the school community and communicate
frequently with school officials. Neighbors testified that
they would have no hesitation in leaving their own chil-
dren in the care of Helen or Susan. Susan's father,
brother, and maternal aunt, and Helen's cousin testified
in favor of the joint adoption. Members of both women's
extended families attested to the fact that they consider
Helen and Susan to be equal parents of Tammy. Both
families unreservedly endorsed the adoption petition.56
The same-sex marriage plaintiffs in Massachusetts 57 featured
couples who were in long term, stable relationships. One couple in
the Goodridge case had been together for thirty years. The petition-
ers often served in positions of responsibility and authority in their
careers and their communities. As described by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, the plaintiffs in the case "include business
executives, lawyers, an investment banker, educators, therapists,
and a computer engineer. Many are active in church, community,
and school groups. '58
The cases make clear that same-sex couples can satisfy a rigor-
ous inquiry as to their ability to be excellent parents. How would
the right to marry affect the well-being of the large number of chil-
dren who now live with homosexual parents? The marriage of their
same-sex parents might positively affect these children's lives in va-
rious ways. First, it would confer significant economic and legal
benefits on those children and on the households in which they
live. State laws grant married couples numerous advantages, such
56. Id. at 317.
57. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003).
58. Id. at 949.
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as tax breaks and entitlement of family members to inherit under
intestacy rules. 59 Health insurance plans cover family members,
and employer benefits packages often include educational benefits
for family members.
Dr. Jill G. Joseph, a pediatrician testifying in opposition to the
proposed Federal Marriage Amendment before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, 60 drew the
legislators' attention to the difficulties faced by same-sex couples
when their children are hospitalized. All parents, she noted, feel
the stress of a child's illness, but special obstacles are now placed in
the way of same-sex couples:
For gay and lesbian families this situation carries addi-
tional and unnecessary stresses. Who has the assured
right to take time off work to care for a now chronically ill
child? If one parent must be home with the child, can the
other provide insurance for the family? These pressing
questions are complicated by the failure of our society to
recognize the legitimacy of this family. Every medical
form asks for the names of the mother and father. There
is no line on the papers for the names of two loving and
now frightened mothers waiting for the surgeon, two wor-
ried fathers taking turns holding the oxygen mask ....
Each of us must ask whether the proposed constitutional
amendment prohibiting the marriage of gay parents
would support the welfare of all families and all American
children, including those hundreds of thousands of chil-
dren whose parents are gay or lesbian .... for me as a
pediatrician, the answer is clear. The Federal Marriage
Amendment will only hurt the well-being of children in
this country.6
1
The benefits of marriage are not only legal and economic, but
psychological and emotional as well. Marriage is an expression of
commitment, made in public, that creates a recognized family unit.
59. A list of benefits is given in State v. Baker, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); see also
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 981.
60. Defense of Marriage Act; Gay Marriage Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 108th CONG. 2004, 2004 WL 871079
(F.D.C.H.).
61. Id.
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It is universally regarded as a major life event by the participants, by
their loved ones, and by society. Same-sex couples who married in
ceremonies in San Francisco, Massachusetts, or elsewhere had
waited years, sometimes decades, for the time to come when they
could marry. 62
Children can profit psychologically and emotionally from their
same-sex parents' marriage. The partners' commitment fosters in
children a sense of security. It brings happiness to the parents, and
children, totally dependent on these adults, benefit when their par-
ents' well-being improves. As the Illinois Supreme Court in In re
Marriage of Collingbourne6" recently observed:
the best interests of the child cannot easily be severed
from the interests of the custodial parent with whom the
child resides, and upon whose mental and physical well-
being the child primarily depends. Because the principal
burden and responsibility of child rearing falls upon the
custodial parent, there is a palpable nexus between the
custodial parent's quality of life and the child's quality of
life. 64
Children's own joy at the marriage of their parents is some-
times quite touching. One thirteen-year old boy who witnessed his
two moms' marriage (and participated as ring-bearer) was quoted
as saying: "I felt thick inside with happiness. Just thick. ' 65 Another
eleven-year-old child said: "It's something I always wanted. I've al-
ways been around people saying, 'Oh, my parents' anniversary is
this week.' It's always been the sight of two parents, married, with
rings. And knowing I'd probably never experience it ever."6 6 He
described the wedding ceremony: "The atmosphere was just spring-
ing with life. Ijust couldn't hold myself in. It was oh my god oh my
62. See Andrea Elliott, They Held Out for Marriage: After 6 Decades of Decorum in Pub-
lic, Gus and Elmer Eloped, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2003.
63. 791 N.E.2d 532 (2003); see also Burgess v. Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25 (1996);
Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996) (holding that child's welfare tied to welfare of
custodial parent).
64. 791 N.E.2d 532, 547 (2002).
65. Patricia Leigh Brown, For Children of Gays, Marriage Brings Joy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
19, 2004, at A14.
66. Id.
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god oh my god. I felt so happy I wanted to scream."67 Children
may also find relief in the social acceptance that marriage of same-
sex parents confers in the wider society.68
C. Avoid Using an Idealized Family Arrangement as the Legal
Standard for Judging Today's Families
The U.S. Supreme Court, in holding that parents have a funda-
mental right to raise children as they see fit, noted that parents
might make decisions that were inconsistent with some prevailing
vision of the "ideal" family. 69
Whatever one's view of the ideal family, it is not an appropriate
standard by which to measure families that live in the real world.
Often the ideal itself is simply a rose-colored view of the past, with
past imperfections conveniently expunged in the process of remem-
bering. The ideal family is often a product of simpler times, fixed
somewhere in the 1950s, when people seemed to conform to a set
of societal norms that were reflected in classic television shows like
"Ozzie and Harriet" and "Leave it to Beaver." That idealized family
life, however, was forever changed by the power of social forces in
the ensuing decades, including the civil rights and women's move-
ments, the widespread acceptance of divorce, the advent of child
daycare, and the creation of two-working parent families.
New York State Family Court Judge Anthony J. Sciolino ex-
pressed the point well in In re Adoption of Caitlin,70 a decision that
permitted adoption of a child by a homosexual couple:
The reality, however, is that most children today do not
live in so-called "traditional" 1950 television situation
comedy type families with a stay-at-home mother and a
father who works from 9:00 to 5:00. According to Bureau
of the Census statistics, twenty-five per cent of children
today are born out-of-wedlock to single women, mostly
young, minority, and impoverished; half of all marriages
end in divorce; and married couples with children now
make up only twenty-six per cent of United States house-
holds. It is unrealistic to pretend that children can only
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000).
70. 622 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1994).
[Vol. 49
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
be successfully reared in an idealized concept of family,
the product of nostalgia for a time long past.
7 1
Just how true the American family ideal ever was is also a mat-
ter of doubt. Our "discovery" of domestic violence, for example,
has shaken some of the mythic foundations surrounding the family.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, sampling the literature and statis-
tics of domestic abuse in a 1984 case, State v. Kelly, remarked: "It is
clear that the American home, once assumed to be the cornerstone
of our society, is often a violent place. '7 2 The court noted:
In enacting the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, the
New Jersey Legislature recognized the pervasiveness and
seriousness of domestic violence: The Legislature finds
and declares that domestic violence is a serious crime
against society; that there are thousands of persons in this
State who are regularly beaten, tortured and in some
cases even killed by their spouses or cohabitants; that a
significant number of women who are assaulted are preg-
nant; that victims of domestic violence come from all soci-
etal and economic backgrounds and ethnic groups; that
there is a positive correlation between spouse abuse and
child abuse; and that children, even when they are not
themselves physically assaulted, suffer deep and lasting
emotional effects from exposure to domestic violence. 73
The spread of no-fault divorce has also challenged the prevail-
ing wisdom about the ideal state of American marriage. If tradi-
tional marriage was working so well, why the astonishing rates of
divorce, exceeding one million every year, sought after despite its
substantial emotional toll on both spouses and their children?
Those who speak glibly of the ideal heterosexual family - with
mother, father, and their children living happily together - over-
look the considerable turmoil in such families caused by high levels
of serious conflict, wife beating, child abuse and neglect, substance
abuse, and adultery.
71. Id. at 841.
72. 478 A.2d 364, 370 n.2 (1984).
73. Id. at 370.
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
New York Surrogate Court Judge Eve Preminger expressed the
realities of today's world when she concluded an opinion approving
an adoption by a same-sex couple with these words:
Finally, this is not a matter which arises in a vacuum. So-
cial fragmentation and the myriad configurations of mod-
ern families have presented us with new problems and
complexities that can not be solved by idealizing the past.
Today a child who receives proper nutrition, adequate
schooling and supportive sustaining shelter is among the
fortunate, whatever the source. A child who also receives
the love and nurture of even a single parent can be
counted among the blessed. Here this Court finds a child
who has all of the above benefits and two adults dedicated
to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and de-
termined to raise him to the very best of their considera-
ble abilities. There is no reason in law, logic or social
philosophy to obstruct such a favorable situation.
74
D. Don't Allow Community Prejudice to Dictate Decisionmaking
About Children's Welfare
Same-sex marriage does cause hostility in certain communities,
and families headed by lesbians or gays may find themselves stigma-
tized. It would be unfair to use this reaction, however, to argue that
these families should not be given legal protection. The treatment
of racism in the community provides a useful analogy. In Palmore v.
Sidoti,75 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a Florida custody ruling
that took a child away from its natural mother, who was white, be-
cause she lived with and eventually married a black man. The
Court acknowledged the likely existence of racial bias in the com-
munity, but refused to bow to it. "The Constitution cannot control
such prejudices," the Court wrote, "but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law can-
not, directly or indirectly, give them effect. ' 7 6
The Palmore opinion echoes a similar sentiment expressed by
the California Supreme Court thirty-six years earlier, when that
74. In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (1992).
75. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
76. Id. at 433.
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court struck down its anti-miscegenation statute. 77 To the argu-
ment that the statute served the salutary purpose of avoiding the
racial animosity that interracial marriage would generate, Justice
Traynor wrote: "It is no answer to say that race tension can be eradi-
cated through the perpetuation by law of the prejudices that give
rise to the tension. 7 If individuals make the private choice to re-
sist popular prejudice, the law should not penalize them for it.
Instead of providing a prop for prejudice, the law should show
the way toward respect for others. A New Jersey superior court
judge demonstrated this idea when, in the course of approving the
adoption of a biological mother's child by her same-sex partner, he
wrote:
Indeed, if there is ever any harassment or community dis-
approval this court should have no role in supporting or
tacitly approving such behavior. The court's recognition
of this family unit through the adoption can serve as a
step in the path towards the respect which strong, loving
families of all varieties deserve. 79
V. CONCLUSION
There is no conclusive, scientific answer to the question of
what children's development and well-being will be if society per-
mits same-sex marriages. This is not surprising, in view of the lim-
ited nature of research done, and the difficulties of doing large
scale, randomized, controlled studies. Indeed, virtually none of the
changes that have dramatically affected the institution of marriage
in recent times - including no-fault divorce and the entry of
mothers of infants and young children into the full-time workforce
- have been preceded by reliable scientific studies demonstrating
the likely effects of such changes on children.
Claims by opponents of same-sex marriage that children will be
harmed must be subject to the strictest examination. Past societal
controversies, over eugenic sterilization and over interracial mar-
riage, highlight the danger of relying on scientific opinion that re-
77. Perez, 198 P.2d 17.
78. Id. at 25.
79. In re Adoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 552 (1993).
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
inforces societal biases. As Justice Brandeis once warned, "we must
be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal princi-
ples."80 Proponents of same-sex marriage may also claim too much
when they draw broad conclusions from anecdotal studies making
positive findings about lesbian and gay parenting.
This does not mean that we cannot make decisions about
same-sex marriage; in fact it is impossible not to make some deci-
sion, either for or against it. The four guidelines suggested here for
considering the welfare of children in the context of same-sex mar-
riage give substantial support to allowing such marriages as a means
to promote the welfare of children raised by these couples.
80. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
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